Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the e¤ects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the e¤ects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a di¤erential model for two games. The …rst one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is o¤ered, while the manufacturer o¤ers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very di¢ cult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface is taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer's pro…ts, and can be pro…t-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain pro…ts goes to the manufacturer. We developed several special cases to strengthen our …ndings.
Introduction
Cooperative advertising programs are monetary incentives o¤ered by manufacturers to their retailers to boost advertising e¤orts for their products. These programs are widely used in supply chains, with an estimated cost
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y Corresponding author  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 of $36 billion paid by manufacturers, which amounts to about 12% of their total advertising spending (Borrell Associates Report, 2015) . Considerable literature has studied the e¤ectiveness of cooperative advertising programs for …rms in the supply chain (see reviews by Aust and Buscher (2014) and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014) ). Results in this literature are derived from game-theoretic models where the …rms'strategies consist of marketing decisions related to pricing, advertising and promotion. The literature assessed the e¤ects of such programs on the …rms' marketing strategies and pro…ts as well as on the supply chain coordination achievements. A common result in this literature is that cooperative advertising programs implemented in bilateral monopolies lead to higher retailer's promotions and advertising expenditures and increased pricing to consumers. In most cases, this combination leads to higher pro…ts for all …rms within a chain, although without mimicking the performance of a vertically integrated chain (e.g., Jørgensen The e¤ectiveness of cooperative advertising programs has been analyzed in both the marketing and operations management literature. In marketing, research has focused on modeling advertising decisions in bilateral monopolistic channels (e.g., Huang and Li, 2001; Li et al., 2002; Xie and Ai, 2006) as well as in more complex settings involving several competitive interactions among channel members (Liu et al., 2014; Karray, 2015; Karray et al., 2017) . Most of this literature characterizes dynamic games using the goodwill model developed by Nerlove and Arrow (1962) (Jørgensen et al., 2000 (Jørgensen et al., , 2003 Karray and Zaccour, 2005; He et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013) . These models assume that advertising subject to cooperative advertising programs impacts the product's brand image (goodwill), which then in ‡uences the demand and the whole business model. In the operations management literature, the use of cooperative advertising programs has mostly been disregarded. A few exceptions are noted. For example, De Giovanni (2011) evaluates the e¤ectiveness of a cooperative advertising program within a quality management problem. He considers that for a manufacturer, it is challenging to decide whether to increase business by investing in quality improvements or by supporting the retailer's advertising e¤orts. De Giovanni and Zaccour (2013) implement a cooperative program within the context of closed-loop supply chain in which …rms cooperate on a green program to increase the number of returns and cost savings. Zhang et al. (2013) model a supply chain in which a retailer invests in a preservation technology e¤ort and a manufacturer proposes a cooperative program to improve the economic outcomes of all …rms. In the context of service operations, Zha et al. (2015) characterize the case in which …rms share the cost when capacity allocation is ine¢ cient. They show the conditions under which a cooperative program leads to coordination (Zha et al., 2015) . Cho and Gerchak (2005) compare traditional coordination schemes such as wholesale price and a revenue-sharing contract to a cooperative advertising program based on operating costs. They consider that a manufacturer pays a part of the retailer's operating cost to achieve coordination. Kaya (2010) compares a cooperative advertising program to other coordination mechanisms, in which a manufacturer pays part of the retailer's e¤orts, which can take several forms. The study shows that a cooperative program can seldom coordinate a chain compared to other more e¢ cient agreements, such as revenue-sharing contracts.
According to the literature we explored, no paper has so far investigated the e¤ect of cooperative advertising programs by also incorporating inventory and production problems. Thus, we contribute to this literature stream by characterizing a game in which a supply chain adopts a cooperative advertising program. Our contribution consists of including both inventory and production decisions (operational issues) along with advertising and pricing decisions (marketing issues). In particular, we consider a supply chain formed by one manufacturer, who sets the production decisions and accumulates inventory at the retailer's store, and  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 a retailer, who decides the price and the advertising e¤orts. The inventory is accumulated according to the inventory dynamics developed by Jørgensen (1986) within a VMI policy. The manufacturer directly manages the inventory at the retailer's store, by increasing the stock through production, and the inventory decreases with consumers'purchases.
In our game, we assume that the manufacturer is challenged by producing at a certain rate to reach operational e¢ ciency and to make his product available for the supply chain. In fact, we focus on a brickand-mortar supply chain framework in which consumers can only purchase products that are available on the retailer's store. The latter is a proxy of the market potential as it corresponds to the maximum amount that can be sold in the market. The retailer sets the price and the advertising e¤orts to increase the sales and decrease the stock of inventory. When a cooperative program is in place, the manufacturer also determines the advertising support to be given to the retailer that would stimulate sales and help control the inventory.
To focus on the e¤ects of cooperative advertising on pro…ts and its e¤ectiveness in coordinating the supply chain, we use a consignment contract according to which the manufacturer supplies the products to be sold to the retailer's store. The retailer sells these products and the two …rms share the pro…ts according to a sharing rule negotiated ex-ante and embedded in the consignment contract (De Giovanni, 2016). Thus, all possible internal ine¢ ciencies linked to double marginalization e¤ects are limited by the use of a sharing contract (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) . Consignment contracts with revenue sharing are very popular in supply chain coordination and have been widely applied in many industries including online marketplaces such as Amazon.com (Li and Hua, 2008) , electronics (Hung et al., 1995) and fashion (Xiao and Jin, 2011) . Under consignment arrangements, the upstream and downstream …rms negotiate beforehand a revenuesharing percentage and, accordingly, the upstream …rm sets the stocking quantity and/or selling price (Wang et al., 2004; Li and Hua, 2008; Li et al., 2009 ). Li and Hua (2008) investigate the suitability of a consignment contract with revenue sharing by using several types of demand functions, and …nd that the mechanism leads to a pro…t-Pareto-improving situation in most cases. Wang et al. (2004) study the management of a supply chain under a consignment contract with revenue-sharing rules and …nd that the share levels as well as the demand price elasticity determine the convenience of using such a coordination mechanism. Adida and Ratisoontorn (2011) investigate two types of consignment contracts, one with a revenue-sharing rule and one without. They discover that an upstream …rm would select a consignment with revenue sharing only when the downstream …rm provides a su¢ ciently large level of di¤erentiation. The latter, instead, will always prefer a consignment without share. Battini et al. (2010) show the bene…ts of a consignment contract for single members of a supply chain as well as for the entire chain even when the operational conditions are challenging due to space constraints, obsolescence risks, demand variability and shortage risks. Li et al. (2009) …nd that a consignment contract with revenue sharing can perfectly coordinate a supply chain when some restrictions are imposed on the demand function. Other papers, such as Dong and Xu (2002) and Cachon (2004) , show that the consignment contract cannot perfectly coordinate the decentralized supply chain, thus leaving an open question on its real suitability. Interestingly, none of these papers deals with the use of a cooperative advertising program under a consignment contract with revenue sharing. Thus, we aim to contribute to this research domain by exploring the suitability of a cooperative advertising program within the framework of consignment contracts with production decisions and inventory problems.
Finally, the literature reveals that VMI and consignment contracts with revenue sharing have been investigated jointly, but without considering a cooperative advertising program. For example, Cachon (2004) and Berstein et al. (2006) identify the conditions according to which a consignment contract with a sharing mechanism works well for the entire supply chain under some speci…c conditions, even in presence of VMI 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 policy. Ben-Daya et al. (2013) show that a VMI policy with a consignment contract allows a supply chain to be better-o¤ when the vendor installs ‡exible production capacity leading to lower setup cost, lower lot-size and frequent shipments. Ru and Wang (2010) explore two settings in which the inventory decisions can be taken either by a supplier or by a retailer. They show that the VMI with a consignment contract works better when the supplier takes care of the inventory. Chen (2013) demonstrates that a VMI with a revenue-sharing agreement is bene…cial only for a few …rms when cooperation is an option. In fact, the retailers can be penalized by such agreements, especially because of their in ‡uence on the pricing strategies. None of the papers we have reviewed explores the bene…ts of a cooperative advertising program within the framework of a VMI policy and a consignment contract, thus leaving a research gap that we aim to …ll.
Accordingly, we solve two Stackelberg di¤erential games in which a VMI policy is complemented through a consignment contract with a revenue-sharing rule. In the …rst game, the manufacturer does not supply any support to the retailer, thus there is no cooperative advertising program in place. This represents our benchmark scenario. In the second game, the manufacturer o¤ers a cooperative advertising program by paying a certain fraction of the retailer's advertising expenses. We analyze the strategies, the pro…t functions and the inventory policy in the two scenarios and contrast the results to check the suitability of a cooperative advertising program within the aforementioned settings. Our …ndings reveal that: 1. Contrary to the marketing literature, coordination with a cooperative advertising program is very di¢ cult when supply chains use a VMI with a consignment contract. 2. In accordance with the literature, a cooperative advertising program leads to larger production and advertising e¤orts and higher prices. 3. Contrary to the literature, the adoption of a cooperative program is seldom pro…t-Pareto-improving because the manufacturer is highly penalized by a cooperative advertising program. 4. The adoption of a cooperative program makes the inventory almost independent of the consignment contract terms and clauses. 5. When a cooperative program is in place, the retailer invests more in advertising even when the share of revenues that she retains decreases. 6. The manufacturer pushes for the implementation of a cooperative program only when the business is not appealing to him, otherwise he will not cooperate. 7. The retailer may prefer not to cooperate when the share of revenues that the manufacturer receives is too high. Further, we extend our model to incorporate four special cases. We …nd that: 1. Under a wholesale price contract, a cooperative program is never feasible. 2. Firms can increase the suitability of a consignment contract with revenue sharing when di¤erentiating between the inventory cost sharing rule and the revenue sharing rule. 3. Firms can better exploit the e¤ectiveness of a cooperative program if inventory obsolescence exists. 4. The suitability of a cooperative program does not depend on the consumers' sensitivity to price and promotion when implementing both VMI and consignment contracts with revenue sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and assumptions. Section 3 exposes the feedback equilibrium solutions obtained for the benchmark and for the cooperative advertising games. In Section 4, we analyze the solutions and compare equilibria across games to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the cooperative advertising program. Section 5 develops some special cases to investigate extensions of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses future research avenues.
Model
Consider a supply chain formed by one manufacturer, M , and one retailer, R. Both …rms make their decisions over an in…nite time horizon. At each instant in time, t, M decides on the production rate, u (t), while R makes all marketing decisions, namely, the level of advertising activities, A (t), and pricing to consumers, We assume that the demand rate takes the following form:
At each instant in time, t, the demand rate is a linear function of the price, p (t), and R's advertising e¤orts, A (t) (e.g., Jørgensen et al., 2000; De Giovanni, 2011) . Further, this formulation assumes that R does not permit shortages (no stockout), meaning she can sell at most the goods available in stock at a speci…c time, t, which is given by the positive inventory level, Y (t). This is very common in brick-and-mortar retail stores, where stockouts occur whenever demand exceeds the level of inventory available at the retail location. We assume that Y (t) D (t) as well as that the delivery lead time is null, meaning that orders are delivered immediately. In this set-up, the inventory Y (t) is a proxy for the market potential.
Demand is positively in ‡uenced by R's advertising activities (e.g., displays and features), and the marginal e¤ect of advertising on demand is represented by the positive parameter . As is common in the economics literature, prices are negatively related to demand, with a unit increase in price leading to lower demand. The marginal e¤ect of price on demand is modeled through the positive parameter .
At each instant in time, the inventory level, Y (t), is increased by the number of units produced by M , u(t), and is reduced by the units sold to consumers, D(t). Following Jørgensen (1986) and Erickson (2012) the dynamic evolution of Y (t) over time, _ Y (t), given an initial inventory at time zero of Y 0 , can be written as follows:
To focus on the pro…tability of cooperative advertising programs without dealing with changes in the other decisions arising from the opportunistic behaviors of …rms, we assume that M and R coordinate their inventory and pricing decisions. In particular, M manages inventory on behalf of R according to a Vendor Management Inventory (VMI) system (Ben-Daya et al., 2013; Chen, 2013; Ru and Wang, 2010) . M and R have agreed on and implemented a cost-sharing contract by which M pays for a portion of the inventory holding costs and R pays for the remaining cost. Consider a total inventory cost of c R Y (t) for the supply chain, where c R > 0 is the marginal inventory cost at the R's store. Therefore, M 's share in the inventory cost is given by
The parameter 2 (0; 1) is the sharing parameter, according to which …rms share both costs and pro…ts.
In such a coordinated supply chain, it is in the best interest of both …rms to reduce the inventory, Y (t), as much as possible. Also, the VMI protects R from aggressive production levels by an opportunistic manufacturer seeking production cost savings from economies of scale. It also pushes R to adopt a proper marketing policy to increase inventory turnover. To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper that accounts for both dynamic inventory, production rate, pricing and advertising strategies to study cooperative advertising programs.
We assume that the …rms' collaboration also extends to price coordination via a consignment contract with a revenue-sharing agreement (Li and Hua, 2008; Li et al., 2009; Adida and Ratisoontorn, 2011) . In particular, M does not charge a wholesale price to R who can set the product price, p (t), without su¤ering from M 's marginalization. As a result, the supply chain members eliminate ine¢ ciencies arising from double marginalization issues. For simplicity, we assume that the same sharing terms for inventory costs are used to share the marginal revenue, p (t). Hence, for each unit sold, M earns, p (t), and R pockets the remaining unit margin, (1 ) p (t). In this set-up, is given, meaning that M and R are engaged in a long-term commitment to share their inventory costs and revenues.
Finally, we assume that the costs of advertising (C A (t)) and of production (C u (t)) take standard convex forms to represent increasing marginal costs (Karray, 2015; He et al., 2009; El Ouardighi et al., 2008) . In particular, the production cost function at each time t takes the following form:
M pays for the cost of producing the product at a marginal cost, h > 0, with a production target k > 0 (El Ouardighi et al., 2008). The parameter k represents the e¢ cient production quantity. M 's production costs are minimized when its production rate is close to k; while any production rate that is lower or higher than the e¢ cient quantity k results in higher costs. The advertising cost (C A ) at each time t is given by
In the case where a cooperative advertising program is implemented in the channel (B (t) 6 = 0), …rms' pro…t functions are the sum of their discounted pro…ts over time (at a discount rate r 2 (0; 1)). They are  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 represented by J M and J R ; respectively, and the …rms'objective functions are given by:
When the …rms do not implement a cooperative advertising program, the cooperative advertising rate takes a null value (B(t) = 0) and is not a choice variable for M 's problem. M 's pro…t margin is represented by his share in the marginal revenue diminished by a portion of the inventory costs ( c R Y (t)). Whenever the cooperative advertising program is implemented, M pays a portion of R's advertising costs at a rate of B (t). Similarly, R's pro…ts are formed by her share in revenues diminished by her share in the advertising costs, whenever a cooperative advertising is implemented, and by her share in the inventory costs.
Further, we assume that M acts as a Stackelberg leader. The marketing and managerial decisions will be determined as feedback strategies. Because the game is played over an in…nite time horizon with timeindependent parameters, we focus on stationary equilibrium strategies. Using stationary feedback strategies means that the manufacturer conditions his decisions at time t upon the current level of inventory. That is the decisions of the supply chain are functions of the current level of the inventory (the state variable), Y .
In a Stackelberg game M , as the …rst mover (leader) announces his production rate (u) and support of R's advertising costs (B). This information is taken into account by R (follower) who chooses the price to consumers (p(Y )) and the level of her advertising e¤orts (A(Y )). Once the information about these later decisions is made available to M; he decides about his actual production rate (u(Y )) and advertising support (B(Y )). The following table summarizes the three steps previously described. This sequence of play is based on the observation that manufacturers usually initiate cooperative advertising programs. In fact, according to a survey conducted by the National Register Publishing, manufacturers announce their cooperative advertising rates before retailers decide on their advertising. 1 This sequence is also based on the managerial practice of deciding on production levels after checking (observing) the available inventory levels. 1 st step M announces u and B 2 nd step R chooses p and A 3 rd step M chooses u and B Table 2 . Sequence of play in the Stackelberg game (M as leader and R as follower)
Equilibrium solutions
We solve the dynamic optimization problems and obtain the equilibrium solutions for both the benchmark and the cooperative advertising games. As for all conventional solutions in dynamic games with in…nite time horizon, all strategies and value functions will be written exclusively as functions of the state variable. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65
The Benchmark scenario (no cooperative advertising)
We start by solving the benchmark (non-cooperative) game, denoted by N , in which a cooperative advertising program is not implemented. In this setting, M focuses on the operational strategies, namely, the production rate, u N (Y ) ; and R sets the marketing strategies, namely, the price p N (Y ) and the advertising e¤orts A N (Y ) : All these strategies contribute to the dynamic evolution of the inventory, and hence, determine its optimal path Y N (t). The game evolves according to the following moves. M announces the feedback production rate without cooperative program, u (Y ). R (the follower) reacts rationally to the leader's announcement and sets the pricing and advertising strategies, p N (Y j u (Y )) and A N (Y j u (Y )) to optimally respond to the M 's announcement. M takes R's best-replies into consideration and solves his problem by optimally setting u (Y ). The solution to the benchmark game yields the equilibrium feedback strategy u N (Y ) for M . Once we have it, we can write R's feedback pricing and advertising strategies,
constitute the Stackelberg feedback solution for the benchmark case. By using these strategies in Eq. (2) and solving the di¤erential equation, the optimal time-path for the inventory level is given by Y N (t) ; for all t 0:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium strategies in the benchmark scenario (no cooperative advertising) are given by:
where M N i ; R N i ; i = 1; : : : ; 3 are the coe¢ cients of the value functions V N M (Y ) and V N R (Y ) given by
These coe¢ cients depend on the model's parameters and the value functions describe the optimal pro…ts along the whole optimal inventory trajectory (Y N (t).
The optimal time-path of the inventory reads:
where
is the steady-state inventory level. This steady state is globally asymptotically stable if and only if M N 1
Proof. See the online Appendix.
Although we characterize the equilibrium solutions analytically, the expressions of strategies, demand and payo¤s depend heavily on all parameter values, thus precluding any analytical insight. We resort to a 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 numerical analysis of these expressions in Section 4, to derive some strategic insights and answer our research questions.
The cooperative advertising scenario
In the cooperative advertising scenario, denoted by C, M o¤ers a cooperative advertising program to R. In this case, M pays a fraction,
Hence, the …rms share the advertising cost, in addition to coordinating their pricing and inventory decisions. Following the same lines as in the non-cooperative scenario, in this setting, M announces the feedback production rate, u(Y ), and his cooperative advertising rate, B(Y ), and R reacts to this announcement and sets her optimal best responses for the price and the advertising e¤orts. The manufacturer takes into account the retailer's best-response functions and optimally sets u C (Y ) and B C (Y ). The retailer's optimal strategies p C (Y ) and A C (Y ) are obtained by injecting the manufacturer's equilibrium decisions into the retailer's bestresponse functions. These optimal strategies are then used in Eqs. (1) and (2) . Solving the di¤erential equation in (2), we get the optimal time-path for the inventory level, Y C (t), for all t 0. The equilibrium solution is provided in the next proposition.
Proposition 2
The equilibrium strategies and pro…ts in the cooperative advertising scenario are given by:
where constants and L i ; i = 1; : : : ; 7 are given in Appendix B. M C i ; R C i (i = 1; : : : ; 3) are the coe¢ cients of the …rms' value functions, which are given by
These coe¢ cients depend on the model's parameters and the value functions describe the optimal pro…ts along the whole optimal inventory trajectory (Y C (t)).
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As in the benchmark scenario, the expressions (13) (16) show that all strategies in the cooperative advertising scenario are state-dependent. In particular, the cooperative advertising support rate also depends on the inventory level held in the channel. Therefore, contrary to previous studies that ignored the e¤ects of inventory on advertising and on operational decisions in the supply chain, this …nding reveals that both M 's support rate and R's advertising decisions should be adjusted to changes in the level of inventory held in the channel. As for the benchmark case, the complexity of the equilibrium solution precludes any analytical development and imposes the requirement that we proceed numerically to shed light into the research contributions and …ndings.
Numerical analysis
Due to the complexity of our model in each game, the parameter values obtained from solving the Riccati's systems of equations are heavily coupled, which preclude any analytical analysis. Thus, we resort to numerical methods to obtain and illustrate our results.
First, we …x the parameter values as follows: 
These parameter values have been chosen for two reasons. First, similar values have been used in the literature (El Ouardighi et al., 2008; De Giovanni, 2011). Second, these values guarantee that the feasible region for both games have common parameter values. A feasible domain corresponding to the equilibrium solution in a game is de…ned as the set of parameter values for which the equilibrium decision variables, demands and pro…ts are positive and the concavity conditions for the players'problems are veri…ed. In the online Appendix, we display the feasibility analysis for parameters ; and . We run many more simulations to identify the feasible region using the other parameters c R ; r and h: For brevity, we do not display the full feasibility region analysis. However, these simulations are available from the authors upon request.
Because the planning horizon is in…nite, we focus on steady-state strategies and payo¤s. After …xing the benchmark parameter values, we characterize the behavior of the di¤erent variables and payo¤s at the steady state (Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Then, we focus on the analysis of the sharing rate parameter (Section 4.3) to identify the region in which a cooperative program is an e¢ cient mechanism, and investigate how strategies and state change accordingly. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Note that the model we propose in this research does not allow for zero inventory, which is instead a target in the operations management literature (e.g., Chen, 2013) . This links to our model assumptions, as Y N SS cannot be null and Y N SS > D N SS . This is also in line with our framework according to which consumers turn away in case of exhausted inventory. Thus, both …rms have an incentive to adjust that stock at a proper level. Speci…cally, when the inventory is very low at the beginning of an ideal planning horizon, …rms will adjust their strategies to reach the inventory at the steady-state level. In contrast, when the initial stock is too high, the …rms'strategies will be set to decrease the stock at the steady-state level.
Steady-State analysis in the N Scenario
Results 1 At the steady state, the following results apply:
The conventional inventory models in the literature suggest that the presence of a large stock leads a …rm to produce less (e.g., El Ouardighi et al., 2008; Chen, 2013). In contrast, our result indicates that production rates increase with higher inventory levels. This is due to the role played by the inventory, which also determines the market potential and then the sales development. Furthermore, the dynamic inventory policy is set according to a VMI policy rather than by using a make-to-stock approach, as in Jørgensen (1986), Kogan and Tapiero (2007) and Erikson (2012) . M expands his business when producing high quantities.
Interestingly, M solves the trade-o¤ between increasing holding cost versus increasing demand by favoring sales growth. Thus, under a VMI policy, the production rate becomes a marketing device to boost sales rather than e¢ ciently reducing the inventory cost. Because large inventory expands the market potential, R can charge a higher price while ensuring that demand will not su¤er from it. This result also depends on larger advertising e¤orts induced by higher accumulated inventory. Overall, the pricing and advertising strategies complement each other to guarantee optimized sales and pro…ts. Intuitively, the presence of large stock leads R to advertise more, with the …nal target to reduce the inventory and increase sales. This …nding depends on the structure of the VMI policy, according to which M manages R's inventory. So, M seeks to increase the inventory as much as possible. Finally, having a wider reference-display obtained by keeping high stocks of inventory translates into larger pro…ts for M . Consequently, there is a need to investigate the conditions as well as the most relevant parameters to assess a VMI policy. Finally, R's pro…ts increase with the stock of inventory. Although the larger advertising e¤orts required to sell o¤ the inventory in stock harm R's pro…ts, M 's contribution to pay the holding cost makes large values of Y pro…table for R as well.
Steady-State analysis in the C Scenario
As in the benchmark scenario, Eqs. (13) (16) show that all strategies are state-dependent. Thus, regardless of the stage of the game, each player observes the level of inventory before setting their strategies. This is consistent with a support program in supply chains and marketing channels, in which a …rm decides to support the advertising e¤orts of a partner to contribute more to the overall business. As for the benchmark 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 scenario, the Riccati's equations to determine the parameters M C i ; R C i ; i = 1; 2; 3 are heavily coupled (see Appendix B) and their values can only be determined by following the same computational procedure as in the N scenario. By using the benchmark parameter values, we then obtain two imaginary and two real roots. Among the real roots, only one satis…es all of the model's assumptions. The "good" root for the cooperative game gives: M C 1 = 0:0848; M C 2 = 0:0393; M C 3 = 0:4529; R C 1 = 0:1930; R C 2 = 0:1745; R C 3 = 2:1192: Accordingly, the strategies, sales, state, and pro…ts take the following steady-state values: Y C SS = 11:9549; u C SS = D C SS = 5:2107; A C SS = 2:8729; p C SS = 5:5268; V C M SS = 6:9851; V C R SS = 9:5856; B C SS = 0:0070: Consistent with the results in the benchmark scenario, there exists only one solution that satis…es the positivity assumptions on strategies, demand, inventory and pro…ts, and should then be used to assess the cooperative scenario.
Results 2 At the steady state, the following results apply:
While the steady-state production rate, advertising and price all change in the state as in the benchmark scenario, a new insight emerges from the cooperative scenario regarding the support program, B C SS , which increases with the inventory. This result can be explained by the dual role of inventory held at R's level. Inventory is a proxy for market potential, representing the maximum number of products that can be demanded from the market. So, when Y C SS is large, the market potential is high, and R exerts higher willingness to invest in advertising e¤orts because of the support program. The latter increases according to the stock of inventory, thus highlighting the idea that …rms use the cooperative program parsimoniously and according to the inventory policy put in place.
Comparison between the cooperative and non-cooperative games
After the analysis at the steady-state, we now …x the benchmark parameter values and focus on analyzing the e¤ects of the sharing parameter, . In doing that, we seek to identify the region in which a cooperative program is an e¢ cient mechanism and investigate how strategies, demand, inventory and pro…ts change accordingly.
We solve the system of Riccati's equations for each scenario with in (0:265; 0:325) with a marginal change of 0:05. Then, we solve the games 25 times and evaluate the corresponding results at the steady state. We supply a sensitivity analysis in an online Appendix to demonstrate the robustness of our …ndings. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65   4 
.3.1 The e¤ects of the sharing parameter on strategies
As displayed in Figure 1 , a positive relationship exists between M 's contribution to R's advertising e¤orts and the sharing parameter, . This result is quite intuitive and depends on the cooperative structure of the game. The greater (smaller) is M 's fraction of revenues, the larger (lower) his support will be. Intuitively, increasing the sharing parameter makes the implementation of a cooperative program more appealing for M; who is willing to pay a larger fraction of R's advertising e¤orts.
<< Insert Figure 1 here >> As displayed in Figure 2 , the presence of a cooperative program substantially in ‡uences R's advertising decision. First, for all values of the sharing parameter, advertising in the cooperative scenario (A C SS ) is higher than that in the non-cooperative scenario (A N SS ), meaning that cooperative advertising leads to higher investments in advertising. This is consistent with the literature about cooperative advertising programs (Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2014) . Second, the e¤ect of the sharing parameter on advertising is reversed when a cooperative advertising program is implemented. In fact, A N SS takes lower values as increases, while A N SS increases with higher values of . Intuitively, when a cooperative program is not on the menu, R sets the advertising e¤orts according to the sharing parameter amplitudes. Therefore, the higher (lower) the share, the lower (higher) the advertising e¤orts. Put di¤erently, when the overall business is marginally economically important for R (e.g., high ), her willingness to contribute to business development through advertising declines. In contrast, the implementation of a cooperative program encourages R to do more even when the share is marginal. R knows that the large sharing parameter values are of considerable interest to M , who positively reacts by …xing very high participation rates (see Figure 1 ). Thus, she invests more in advertising e¤orts given that M will take care of a part of these investments.
<< Insert Figure 2 here >> In Figure 3 , we obtain the prices in the cooperative advertising (p C SS ) and the benchmark (p N SS ) scenarios at the steady state as functions of the sharing parameter. Comparison of these prices shows that the implementation of the cooperative advertising program leads to a higher retail price. This result is in line with the generally accepted …nding in the literature, according to which cooperative advertising expands demand through increased advertising expenditure, which allows the retailer to then charge a higher price for the manufacturer's product (e.g., Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2014; He et al., 2009; De Giovanni, 2011).
The role of both advertising e¤orts and inventory becomes crucial in this sense. Thanks to their e¤ects, R charges a higher price under a cooperative program without losing sales (see our earlier discussion). Interestingly, the price increases with the sharing parameter in both scenarios. This trend has a strategic meaning. When the sharing parameter is low, R gets the largest portion of the entire business. Consequently, a low price ensures a high economic reward for R. When the sharing parameter is high, R sets a high price to make M economically worse o¤. Note that the slope at which the price increases with is higher when …rms do not cooperate. Figure 3 here >> Figure 4 displays the changes in both demand and the production rate according to the sharing parameter in the two scenarios. Remember that the production rate and demand are equal at the steady state due to the particular form of the state equation (Eq:(2)). Intuitively, the larger the proportion of revenues M gets, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 the greater will be his production involvement. Hereby, M solves the trade-o¤ between marginal revenues and lower production cost in favor of the former. Speci…cally, any time the supply chain negotiation outcome grants a larger share to M , the production rate substantially moves away from the operational e¢ ciency benchmark, k. Indeed, M is also responsible for the inventory at R's store and for the market potential amplitude. Thus, the more appealing the business becomes for M (large ), the more he will be involved in business development through production. A cooperative program has a positive e¤ect on M 's production decisions. Because M in ‡uences inventory turnover through supporting R's advertising e¤orts, he produces a lower amount for any given sharing parameter value, decreasing de facto the sales in the cooperative scenario. This depends on the higher price charged to consumers, thus M produces and sells a lower amount at a higher price when supporting R's advertising e¤orts. The adoption of a cooperative program allows M to be more operationally e¢ cient as the production rate does not move too far away from the target, k. Overall, a cooperative program allows M to better control the inventory by controlling his production, pricing and advertising support.
<< Insert
<< Insert Figure 4 here >> Figure 5 displays the relationship between inventory and the sharing parameter in the two scenarios analyzed. When M 's share is low, he has less willingness to produce within this business, thus low inventory leads to low production rate and, consequently, to a low market potential. When M gets a larger share, he produces more and accumulates larger stock of inventory. In such cases, inventory is always larger than the production rate and the demand. Interestingly, there is a parameter region for in which the steady-state inventory without a cooperative program is larger than the steady-state inventory under a cooperative program. In fact, increasing sharing parameter values incentivizes R to advertise more, thus increasing inventory turnover. Intuitively, when stock at the steady state is large, R's advertises more to attract more consumers and reduce that stock. Further, the adoption of a cooperative program mainly stabilizes the inventory policy that is quite insensitive to changes in the sharing parameter. Thus, a cooperative program on advertising e¤orts is highly e¢ cient as it decreases the amount of inventory in the supply chain and this e¤ect is quasi sharing parameter independent, meaning that the inventory (and its related costs) will be considerably lowered with the presence of a cooperative program.
The e¤ects of the sharing parameter on inventory
<< Insert Figure 5 here >> 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 value that makes M indi¤erent between cooperating and non-cooperating. For > ; M would prefer not to cooperate.
The e¤ects of the sharing parameter on pro…ts
This …nding is novel within the literature of supply chain and distribution channel coordination that sponsors the adoption of a cooperative program. When the supply chain implements a VMI policy complemented by a consignment contract with revenue sharing, cooperative advertising is a di¢ cult program with which to achieve better performance. This can be due to di¤erent motivations. First, R's advertising e¤orts increase with the sharing parameter, thus supporting larger advertising investments that can be detrimental for M 's pro…ts. Second, pricing strategies tend to converge in the sharing parameter values, thus the stronger the coordination, the lower the capability to extract more value from the market. For example, the literature shows that when a support program exists, …rms are able to set higher prices without losing sales due to the bene…ts provided by these mechanisms (e.g., Karray and Zaccour, 2006; Karray, 2013 ; Martín-Herrán and Sigué, 2017). Interestingly, our …ndings do not con…rm this conclusion. Third, M produces less under a cooperative program, given that he needs to spend some e¤ort to support the advertising investments. This directly leads to lower demand and pro…ts. Finally, a cooperative program stops being convenient when V N M SS is larger than V C M SS under a cooperative program, that is when > . Indeed, because the inventory links to the store display and product availability, it represents a proxy of market potential that has a considerable impact on M 's pro…ts. Thus, since M is the leader of the chain, he will always look at the nature and the value of ; then he will announces a wish to implement a support program and play cooperatively.
Therefore, depending on the value of the sharing parameter, , M chooses one of the following three contractual options:
1. When < 0:2675; only the non-cooperative scenario is feasible, thus M will always avoid cooperative advertising.
2. When 0:2675 < ; M will support the R's advertising e¤orts and o¤er a cooperative advertising program.
3. When > ; M will avoid cooperative advertising as it leads to lower sales due to high prices.
<< Insert Figure 6 here >> As displayed in Figure 7 , the patterns of R's pro…ts follow the opposite patterns of M 's pro…ts in both scenarios. R's pro…ts have a decreasing behavior with respect to the sharing parameter; numerically, one can show that @V N R SS @ < 0 and @V C R SS @ < 0 for the range of values of the sharing parameter we analyzed. During the negotiation phase, R would design the contract parameters and clauses accordingly.
It results that V C R SS > V N R SS for in the range of interest. Thus, R always prefers the implementation of a cooperative program. This is in line with the general accepted result in the marketing literature, according to which the …rm receiving the support is generally better o¤ (e.g., Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2014). Note that V N Rj =0:265 = V C Rj =0:3075 : This highlights the idea that the R's pro…ts without a cooperative program under a certain sharing parameter (e.g., = 0:265) and R's pro…ts with a cooperative program and high sharing parameter values (e.g., = 0:3075) coincide. Therefore, R can be indi¤erent between cooperating with a high share and avoiding a cooperative program with low shares. When …rms negotiate the contract terms, retailers should know that receiving a support and getting a smaller fraction of revenues can be equivalent to receiving no support and getting a larger fraction of revenues. This is relevant for retailers when they have to decide whether to enter into collaboration with other parties or not.
<< Insert Figure 7 here >>  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Comparison of the results in Figures 6 and 7 indicates that the sharing parameter values that make a cooperative program feasible and preferable for both …rms M and R is very tiny. At equilibrium, both …rms maximize their pro…ts under a cooperative program when 2 ; ; thus a cooperative advertising program is pro…t-Pareto-improving only inside this region of sharing parameter values. The latter corresponds to the sharing parameter value range that makes the cooperative solution feasible and pro…table for M . During the negotiation process, …rms should aim at …xing the sharing parameter within this range. When collaboration is not on the menu, reaching an agreement will be extremely di¢ cult as @V C M SS @ > 0 and @V C R SS @ < 0. Our general …ndings suggest that when the supply chain problem involves operational issues such as production and inventory, beside marketing issues such as pricing and advertising, the region in which a cooperative program by means of a support program turns out to be economically worthwhile is very limited and the adoption of this coordination mechanism very challenging.
Time-trajectories analysis
The comparisons of the value functions at the steady-state as earlier considered assume that we compute the accumulated pro…ts along the optimal trajectory of the inventory level when the initial inventory is already at the steady-state value. In this subsection, we draw the strategies, demand, inventory level and pro…ts along the optimal time-path of the inventory level when the initial inventory is greater than the steady state, speci…cally, Y 0 = 15. Because the inventory level is a proxy of the market potential, we consider that it is logical to assume that the …rms would use a high initial inventory level to avoid stockouts.
We display the full analysis on the trajectories for strategies, demand, state variable and pro…ts in Appendix C. As expected, we obtain the transition towards the steady-state values, that is, the analysis along the optimal time-paths converging towards the steady state. We show that the results established at the steady state can be replicated when the initial inventory level is higher or equal to the steady state. Given an initially high value of the inventory (Y 0 = 15), the inventory decreases towards its steady-state value. All the decision variables also monotonously decrease towards their steady-state values, both for the N Scenario and the C Scenario. The optimal time-paths of the benchmark and the cooperative advertising scenarios never cross. From the previous analysis, we know that at the steady state all variables take a larger value under the C Scenario than under the N Scenario. Therefore, our …ndings and managerial implications can be always replicated when the initial value of the inventory level is higher or equal to the steady-state value.
Special cases
In this section, we develop four special cases, which are variants of our original model. In particular, we develop three special cases based on the use of a classical wholesale price contract under a VMI policy, the use of di¤erent sharing parameters for costs and revenues, the presence of inventory obsolescence, as well as the relationship between pricing and promotion in the demand function.
Special case I -Wholesale price with VMI and a cooperative program
In this section, we develop a dynamic game that conserves all ingredients of the model developed in Eqs. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65 ! (t) < p (t). R sets the retail price without sharing anything with M . This scenario allows us to isolate the VMI e¤ects from the coordination e¤ects, that is, understand if the …ndings displayed in Section 4 depend on the inventory policy or on the coordination mechanism. Indeed, we expect that a wholesale price contract (WPC) is less e¢ cient than a revenue sharing contract (RSC), as largely supported by the literature on supply chain coordination exploring the framework of a simple supply chain (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) . Nevertheless, we aim at exploring the e¢ ciency of cooperative programs under a WPC and VMI policy. To pursue this target, we develop a WPC game without a cooperative program, which is described as follows:
To …nd the equilibrium of this game, we followed the same procedure as described in Proposition 1 and Appendix A.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium strategies in the benchmark scenario (no cooperative advertising) with a wholesale price contract are given by:
where M 
These coe¢ cients depend on the model's parameters and on the value functions describing the optimal pro…ts along the whole optimal inventory trajectory (Y N (t)).
The optimal time-path of the inventory reads: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 where
is the steady-state inventory level. This steady state is globally asymptotically stable if and only if
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3.
The benchmark game will then be compared to the cooperative program game, in which M optimally sets the participation rate, B (t). The …rms'problem is described as follows:
dt;
When deriving the equilibrium for this game, we use the benchmark parameter values as in (19) and numerically …nd that the participation rate gives unfeasible solutions at the steady-state. Therefore, we conclude that the cooperative program under a wholesale price contract is never feasible for all possible combinations of parameter values. This is due to the fact that the scarce coordination among …rms imposes M to be far from his operational target while the additional participation e¤orts are very detrimental for his pro…ts. Thus, a WPC does not o¤er any opportunities to coordinate the chain when VMI and cooperative programs are o¤ered together.
Special case II -VMI with a RSC and di¤erent sharing parameters for revenues and inventory costs
So far, we discuss our settings by assuming that the supply chain …rms use the same sharing rule, ; for both revenues and inventory costs. In this section, we develop a special case di¤erentiating between the sharing rule for revenues, r ; and the sharing rule for the inventory cost, c : Note that the term c R c Y in M 's pro…t function (in Eq. (5)) and the term c R (1 c ) Y (t) in R's pro…t function (in Eq. (6)) are the only components of the model that are in ‡uenced by the use of di¤erent sharing parameters. Consequently, the strategies displayed in Eqs. (7)-(9) remain the same while it su¢ ces to …x = r : Finally, the expressions 2hc R and hc R (1 ) in the second and …fth equations of the Riccati systems for scenarios N and C (see Appendices A and B) become 2hc R c and hc R (1 c ) ; respectively, while = r for all other parameters. With this change, the results generated with our original model in Figures 6 and 7 ( c = r ) become as displayed in Figures 8-11 ( c 6 = r ). Accordingly, the following remarks can be made about the results:
1. Given a …xed sharing rule for inventory cost (e.g., c = 0:2675), …rms have large chances to be economically better-o¤ through a cooperative program. In Figure 8 , the region of r values in which M obtains larger pro…ts enlarges comparatively to the ones in Figure 6 , as the maximum sharing parameter values moves from 0.2725 to 0.2825. In Figure 9 , R shows the same preferences as in Figure 7 , thus she always opts for the implementation of a cooperative program, independent of using similar or di¤erent sharing rules for pro…ts and inventory costs. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 << Insert Figure 8 here >> << Insert Figure 9 here >> 2. When …xing the sharing rule of the revenues (e.g., r = 0:2675), …rms show reverse preferences in Figures 10-11 , comparatively to Figures 6 and 7 . Speci…cally, M 's pro…ts always increase in c while R's pro…ts always decrease in c : This is very much intuitive and expected as it relates to sharing costs. Interestingly, from Figures 10 and 11 , we can identify three ranges of c for which …rms'preferences change:
-When c < 0:275; there exists a Pareto-improving region in which both …rms are economically better-o¤ through a cooperative program. Therefore, for low values of revenue sharing parameters, …rms should cooperate under a VMI policy.
-When c 2 [0:275; 0:295); M is not economically interested in a cooperative program, while R still prefers this option. This highlights the need for a complementary coordination program to implement a VMI as cost-pro…t sharing associated to a cooperative program are not su¢ cient to coordinate a chain.
-When c 0:295; all …rms are economically worse-o¤ with the cooperative program.
<< Insert Figure 10 here >> << Insert Figure 11 here >>
Special case III -VMI with a RSC and inventory obsolescence
In this section, we investigate the e¤ect of inventory obsolescence on …rms'pro…ts and on cooperative programs e¤ectiveness. So far, we assumed that the products in inventory have a very long shelf life, i.e., do not expire, which refers to the case of durable goods. Therefore, inventory Y (t) is fully available to consumers at time t. This assumption is in line with sectors like iron and furniture in which manufacturers can work in make-tostock without considering the inventory obsolescence issue. Hereby, we relax this assumption and model the inventory obsolescence by adding the positive parameter in the demand function. denotes the natural inventory obsolescence in a speci…c moment in time and informs on the amount of goods that is not available to consumers because the goods become obsolete. Therefore, we …x 1 when inventory is subjected to obsolescence. Obsolescence negatively a¤ects the demand function (e.g., Teunter et al., 2011) , which modi…es as follows:
This demand formulation implies that the goods at the R's store are Y (t) : Strategies, pro…ts and inventory dynamics in the N and C scenarios can be derived by following the same procedure used in Propositions 1 and 2. Then, we study the problem at the steady state and focus here on the analysis of pro…ts. We use = 0:85; 0:9; 0:95; corresponding to an obsolescence rate of 15%, 10% and 5% respectively. Firms'pro…ts are displayed in Figure 12 , which provides us with the following insights:
1. Intuitively, compared to the case with no inventory obsolescence ( = 1), obsolescence results in losses in inventory and demand, which leads to lower pro…ts for all supply chain …rms.
2. Figure 12 shows that R always prefers the implementation of a cooperative program. This result is similar to the one generated without inventory obsolescence e¤ects (Figure 7) . Hence, R always bene…ts from a cooperative program independent of inventory obsolescence.
3. M adjusts his preferences for a cooperative program depending on the sharing parameter. In particular, the faster the inventory obsolescence, the lower the sharing parameter that M prefers. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 4. Increasing values of inventory obsolescence increase the chances to use a cooperative program to coordinate …rms'targets. As it is a supply chain issue, all …rms get involved to coordinate and mitigate its negative e¤ects.
<< Insert Figure 12 here >> 5.4 Special case IV -VMI with a RSC and R
In the numerical analysis that we developed earlier, we assumed the parameter values to be …xed in the demand function such that > ; meaning that demand is more sensitive to price than to promotion. In this section, we relax this assumption and assume that can be higher or lower than : We set = 1:5 and change = 1:4; 1:5; 1:6. The analysis of pro…ts, which is displayed in Figure 13 , leads to the following observations:
1. When the price e¤ect is lower than the promotion's e¤ect ( < ), both …rms gain higher pro…ts in each game. Intuitively, the higher the importance of promotion over pricing, the higher …rms'pro…ts due to the lower consumers'sensitivity to price.
2. R invests more in promotion and always sponsors the adoption of a cooperative program to coordinate the chain. She always …nds it convenient to implement the cooperative program, thus following the results displayed in Figure 7 . 2. For < ; a cooperative program does not become more appealing to coordinate the chain. Consistently with Figure 13 , M is willing to implement a cooperative program only for small regions of ; hence following the same results as in Figure 6 . Therefore, coordination through a cooperative program with VMI and RSC is a real challenge, independent of the consumers'sensitivity to price and promotion. However, note that the region of interest is larger than in the benchmark case, which shows that there is a higher chance to bene…t from coordination through a cooperative program when the interested strategy (promotion in our games) is more important than others in developing sales.
<< Insert Figure 13 here >>
Conclusions
The cooperative advertising literature has mostly studied the e¤ects of these programs considering marketing (demand-side) variables, such as, advertising and prices. However, the operations management literature has long noted the importance of integrating these marketing decisions to operational (supply-side) variables related to production and inventory management. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) agreement is complemented by a consignment contract with revenue sharing. We develop a model where both marketing and operational variables are considered. We solve a di¤erential Stackelberg game where the manufacturer (M ) is the leader and the retailer (R) is the follower. The equilibrium solutions for pricing, advertising e¤ort and production rate are then obtained in two games. The …rst game is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is o¤ered. In the second game, M o¤ers the cooperative program to support R's advertising e¤orts. We summarize our …ndings in a few points:
1. Inventory is used as a marketing tool to ensure a certain market potential. Through a cooperative advertising program, …rms are willing to do more: M produces more, R promotes more, the supply chain keeps larger inventories, while R optimally manages the trade-o¤ between pricing and promotion. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 2. Contrary to the marketing literature that lauds the use of a cooperative advertising program to make all supply chain members economically better o¤, the presence of a VMI policy complemented by a consignment contract with revenue sharing makes a cooperative advertising program very di¢ cult to implement. Our …ndings suggest that there is a very small region in which all …rms can improve their pro…ts by adopting a support program, thus highlighting the serious di¢ culties that companies can face when the ingredients that we used in our model are all simultaneously present. M will decide to support R's advertising e¤orts only when the sharing parameter is negotiated ex-ante and is …xed within some boundaries. R is more favorable towards the presence of a cooperative program and will prefer to have support for her advertising e¤orts in most cases. Nevertheless, she will be indi¤erent between advertising support with high sharing and no advertising support with low sharing. Overall, the implementation of a support program is rather complicated when operational and marketing devices are considered simultaneously.
3. The presence of a cooperative program stabilizes inventory, which becomes less dependent on the sharing parameter. When M is economically better o¤ with a cooperative advertising program, the supply chain holds higher stocks of inventory, thus ensuring larger business opportunities.
4. The implementation of a cooperative advertising program reverses the relationship between advertising e¤orts and the sharing parameter. In a non-cooperative setting, larger share means lower economic resources for R, who consequently shows less willingness to spend on advertising. Nevertheless, when a cooperative program is in place, R invests more in advertising even when the share she retains decreases due to the presence of a support program whose amplitude increases with the sharing parameter.
Further, we develop some special cases to investigate the convenience of using a VMI policy under a traditional wholesale price contract, the use of di¤erent sharing parameters for costs and revenues, the role of inventory obsolescence and the e¤ects of pricing and promotion in the demand function. We …nd that cooperative programs under a wholesale price contract are never feasible. Consequently, …rms are not able to coordinate their chain through a cooperative program when a VMI and a wholesale price contract coexist. We discover that supply chains can increase the suitability of revenue sharing within the contest of VMI and cooperative programs when di¤erentiating between sharing parameters for costs and revenues. Working on these two contractual terms makes a cooperative program more appealing. Inventory obsolescence harms the whole supply chain pro…tability, thus …rms can better exploit a cooperative program to improve their economic performance. Finally, supply chains have few chances to use cooperative programs in the context of VMI and consignment contracts with revenue sharing, independent of the consumers'sensitivity to price and promotion.
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